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
seems like a small undertaking when looked back upon from the point of view of the Air Transport Command's later achievements. When General Arnold directed the Command to carry out this operation in October 1941. It was in fact an important "first" marked throughout by elements which were to be characteristic of its later operations. Until then our deliveries had been to "the point of ultimate take-off" within the Western Hemisphere as described in the President's directive. No deliveries by military crews had been made outside of North America. Not only would this be the first delivery beyond the continent, but also the first of combat aircraft in combat condition to the theatre of action, and the first over the South Atlantic to Africa, a route which was only beginning to be explored, by the Command and by Pan-American Airways.

In carrying out its task the Command ran into and solved problems and difficulties which were to be characteristic. The complexity of supporting arrangements for an operation of this type were beautifully — even infuriatingly — illustrated. And with Pearl Harbor this type was to

- 1) The basic reference for this account is the file "16 LB-30's" in Central files, HQ/AFATC. This contains all messages and correspondence referred to, except the President's letters to the Secretary of War. Personal information was received from Colonel George F. Brewer and Lieutenant Colonel Louis T. Reichers, whose activities are described in the text, and also from Mr. David Lehman, who was at that time Chief Clerk of the Ferrying Command and who was a passenger on the second Liberator delivered.
- 2) Following the usage of the period under consideration, these aircraft will be referred to as "Liberators". That designation was used to denote the English modification of the Consolidated four-engine bomber, while B-24 denoted the American modification.



appear thereafter.



The background of General Arnold's directive is one of high military and political considerations. In the end of September 1941, the British in the Middle East were holding the German-Italian forces along the Egyptian frontier after a severe defeat. At Tobruk the resistance of the isolated Australians was becoming world-famous. The pacification of Iraq had recently been completed, the re-occupation of Syria had been carried out and was being consolidated, and the British and Russians were in the process of establishing themselves in Persia. Nopping-up operations in Italian-dominated East Africa were not yet finished.

British prestige in the Near East had recovered from its lowest ebb, but it was far from high. At the same time these varied operations had required a dangerous dispersal of forces, especially of aircraft, leaving the Empire forces in Egypt confined to an active defense.

The German offensive against Russia had been slowed, but pressure continued severe against Leningrad and in the South and they were just mounting the great, final assault of 1941 on Moscow.

In this atmosphere General Brett, on the completion of his inspection of the Middle East, had the following cablegram sent to the War Department under date of September 29th, 1941, received early in the morning of October let:

*From Brett for Arnold is this cable. Careful surveys and discussions show that equipment for Russia should be rationed, and besides






and that in making sorties from their bases on the Canal to Benghasi. Wellingtons had to refuel en route, which would be unnecessary for the four-motored planes. He asked for delivery of one Squadron, sixteen planes, and that all the ferrying crews should remain to give instruction in their use. The planes should arrive fully armed and ready for action, equipped with Sperry bomb-sights. Spare parts and supplies should be shipped to Suez by water at once.

This information General Brett conveyed to General Arnold by cable on October 17th. The War Department's decision was quick and favorable, with the only exception that we could not leave sixteen crews for instruction, but would leave four crews to remain for one month. The following day the Ferrying Command was notified. The British were requested to authorize the British Aircraft Commission to divert the sixteen Liberators and were asked to specify their destination.

The mission was now the Ferrying Command's, which at that time, in addition to its operations within North America, was working on the delivery of ninety Stinson Reliant trainers to the R. A. F. at Trinidad, and on October 6th had been asked to handle delivery by the South Atlantic Route of seven hundred North American Mitchell bombers, twenty-five Lockheed Hudsons, and all Martin 187's coming available prior to March 19th, 1942. These requirements did not involve ferrying an excessive number of planes at one time, but maintaining a steady flow as they came off the assembly lines. Operations beyond Miami would be largely in the hands of Pan-American Air Ferries, which was then beginning to survey the route from Matal to Cairo.





"This is not a sympathetic move, but in view of political and military situation am sure it will steady the political situation locally and in the Middle East and offer the only means of offensive action instead of a plan of steady defense."3)

The emphasis which General Brett gave to assurances that the Liberators would be well and fully used probably relates to the fact that our General Staff knew that the British were skeptical of these planes, and had not made full use of them in Great Britain.

On arrival in London, after consultation with Ambassador Winant,

General Brett took up his proposal with the Prime Minister, who strongly

approved of it, and then with Air Chief Marshall Portal, Chief of the Air

Staff. In a memorandum to General Brett, Air Chief Marshall Portal pointed

out that Liberators would be able to carry 8,000 pounds of bombs on each

sortie, as against the 2,000 pounds capacity of the Wellingtons then in use,

3) Paraphrased.





Having an important bearing on the new undertaking was the fact that on October 7th, Colonel Caleb V. Haynes completed the first round trip of the South Atlantic shuttle between Washington and Cairo, and on this day. October 18th, Lieutenant Louis T. Reichers landed at Bolling Field at the end of the historic Trip 15 of the North Atlantic Division, having flown from U. K. to Moscow, thence home via Cairo and Natal. The information gained by these two flights was priceless. Lieutenant Reichers' narrative, especially, emphasizes the relatively primitive conditions of the trans-African route. 4)

A skeleton list of the activities to be carried out in support of the new mission is impressive. It was necessary:

- 1. To plan the operation so as to interfere as little as possible with the flow of Liberators and other aircraft to Montreal for ferrying to the United Kingdom. As the British Aircraft Commission pointed out, the period of good weather over the North Atlantic route was growing short, and should be fully exploited.
 - 2. To find and assemble the sixteen planes.
- 3. To check them for making a flight for which their capacity was not fully known, and equip them accordingly.
- 4. For the first time to prepare a full list of equipment for this new type of operation and assemble it for installation along a domestic route which had not previously been used for this type of plane.
- 5. To clear the somewhat complex question of transfer of title, from the British to the United States and back, and related to this, settle arrangements for payments for special installations, equipping and other work involved.
- 6. To ensure that return ferrying would be available for the crews, through the service Pan-American was in the process of developing.
- 7. To secure an amendment to the President's directive of October 3d. 1941, under which the Command was then operating, to permit ferrying to Africa.
- 4) Flight Report, Trip 16. Lieutenant Louis T. Reichers.





8. To make sure that fuel and oil would be available at all points along the route.

Some of these requirements involved many factors. In regard to the planes' capacity and special equipment for the flight, accurate information had to be secured on the African airdromes. This proved unexpectedly difficult. If the Jeswang Airdrome at Bathurst, Gambia, 1,852 miles from Natal⁵⁾ or the Waterloo Airdrome at Freetown, Sierra Leone (1,821 miles) could be used, extra tanks might not be necessary, but if the flight had to be made to Accra, a distance of 2,441 miles from Natal, they would be necessary.

South American Republica hinged matters which might result in vexatious delay. If the Liberators would be allowed passage only as civilian, American aircraft they would carry American insignia and carry their guns as cargo. If they could go as unarmed, military aircraft, British or American, their guns must be shipped separately, by clipper, and their marking must correspond to the nationality. If they could go as armed military planes, they could fly with their guns installed.

The problem of securing crews was eased by the coincidence that on October 18th the North Atlantic Division's shuttle service was temporarily suspended, pending winterization of its aircraft and other improvements. This released eight B-24 crews, which made it possible to fill the complement of sixteen -- eighty men -- without interfering with continental deliveries for the United Kingdom. Arrangements were made with the Combat

5) Distances according to the Route Manual of July 22, 1942.



fuel from the auxiliaries to the main tank, with no provision in case this should fail.

By fast, firm action, Lt. Reichers got the installation changed back to his approved plan in record time. The first Liberator left the plant November 13th, the second on the 14th, with two more to follow in short order.

While all this was going on, the Command was attending to the varied matters previously listed, as well as arranging such items as inoculating the crews with the serums necessary for the extreme tropics, securing passports, and so forth. It was also in this sixth month of its existence installing a shuttle service to Cairo, opening and staffing a delivery route through Cairo to Russia, developing plans for China, working on the far Northern route, and carrying out its routine activities. On November 24th the President issued his "blank check" directive authorizing extension of deliveries "to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the Lend-Lease program", an enlargement of scope which could be made greater by nothing short of war.

The matter of the auxiliary tanks is stressed because it exemplifies the incongruity of making an urgent movement by air dependent on slow, overland (or over-water) transportation, and the necessity, increasingly recognised later, of equipping an organization established for the purpose of achieving high-speed, air-borne delivery (whether of bombs upon a target, or personnel or freight to combat sones, or of the aircraft themselves), with the authority and means to support itself or to be supported by air. It happened by chance that after December 12th we were well able

to use for ourselves the planes whose delivery had thus been held up, but that is hardly even a palliation. Setting that aside, between getting a full squadron of heavy bombers to Cairo, their crews trained and ready to go, early in December, or not until sometime in 1942, the difference was made first by the difficulty of securing accurate, technical information from other than the Command's own sources, and secondly and more importantly, by tying the operation to the ground.

Liberator Number One, under Lieutenant E. D. Reynolds, departed from Bolling Field November 21st, arriving at Borinquen, P. R. the same day. Their route was laid out as Borinquen - Natal - Accra - Kano - El Fasher - Cairo. (Some of the planes delivered stopped at Khartoum.) The flight as far as Belem, where Pan American services were utilized, was uneventful with the exception that the high frequency radio failed during flight from Borinquen to Belem. Although the high frequency radio was not functioning, because of the high priority of the mission, Lieutenant Reynolds elected to continue the flight to Natal on the 23rd of November. A successful flight to Natal was accomplished, but no maintenance assistance could be obtained, nor were there any technicians available that were qualified to perform trouble-shooting on the equipment installed on the Liberator.

In addition to the absence of technical assistance, there was also a complete lack of needed flight information, because a meteorological advisory and reporting system had not been established

on the east coast of South America. A decision to continue the flight without the desired flight and weather information and without high frequency radio aid was again made on the basis of the priority of the mission. At that time, the political situation at Natalwas a difficult one, with the Italian Lati line still exerting a powerful influence.

It should be noted that the assignment of Lieutenant Matthews to this flight was for the purpose of his indoctrination and checkout. Lieutenant Matthews was a well-qualified pilot and fully capable of flying the airplane. On this basis, Lieutenant Reynolds decided to rotate flight legs with Matthews during the course of the flight. Lieutenant Matthews was in the left seat acting as pilot during the flight from Belem to Natal and based on this rotation, Lieutenant Reynolds was to fly the next leg of the mission to Accra.

They cleared from Natal that same night at 23:45 and landed at Accra, without special incident, at 13:00 o'clock on November 24th. This was the first American plane to land at that field, and it was given an excellent reception. The radio was still completely out of order and no replacement parts could be provided in Accra.

Although the station agent of Pan American had suggested that the flight to El Fasher be undertaken during hours of darkness, in order to facilitate navigation, Lieutenant Reynolds decided to undertake th flight from Accra to El Fasher (omitting Kano as unnecessary) during daylight hours and without radio in view of the excellent work his navigator-bombadier team had done to date. Again, the decision was made in order to compress the flight time to Cairo as much as possible.

They departed at 06:15 on November 25th, and up to this point, the basic navigation had been achieved by means of dead reckoning, and confirmed by celestial means. The success of the flight from the U. S. to Accra was the result of excellent team effort between the navigator and bombadier. The bombadier used the installed Sperry bomb sight at the instrument for determining drifts. Complete absence of meteorological information across Central Africa prevented the Commander from knowing that almost the entire route was covered by heavy ground haze and blowing sand. This condition prevented accurate drift readings, and the dead reckoning that could be accomplished was that of plotting a course and flying it without being able to apply compensating drifts and hoping that varying winds would balance any drifts to the right or left of course. Inasmuch as the course was due east, the accurate speed lines could be determined via celestial navigation, i. e., moving sun lines forward. Accurate fixex on eastwest courses prove highly inaccurate in determining precise positions. Late that afternoon, they discovered that they were lost. Commander attributes to two things: First, the difficult navigation conditions, and the fact that El Fasher was plotted incorrectly on the navigation chart. After two hours of cruising in search of that

field, Lieutenant Reynolds took over the navigation. (The co-pilot, Lieutenant Matthews, had been acting as pilot since leaving Accra, and continued to do so). A flight pattern was established at low cruise and maximum economy over a fixed position on the ground, identified by a nomad campfire. As soon as it became sufficiently dark and a fix on the stars could be obtained, Lieutenant Reynolds plotted their position as somewhere between 150 and 175 miles south and east of El Fasher.

Feeling that the fix was a reliable one, Lieutenant Reynolds
decided to plot a course for El Fasher and after flying out the
time period to where El Fasher should have been, there was nothing
but abysmal darkness, with but a few scattered nomad campfires.
Since fuel was becoming critical, the Commander chose to seek El
Obeid further east, rather than set up a search pattern for El
Fasher, since, if forced down by lack of gas, which was running low, in the

latter case he would have had to attempt a night landing on the desert or parachute jump. Heading east, had they missed El Obeid, they still had a fair chance of continuing to the edge of the Nile, where a landing on its banks could be attempted.

As it was, Reynolds' navigation proved accurate and they flew directly to the town of El Obeid; however, the arrival was about 20 minutes early because of the erroneously plotted position.
El Obeid was easily identified, but the landing field had no markings. A flare dropped from 10,000 feet gave no results, but another from 3,000 feet showed them the airdrome. By now, their gas was dangerously low, well below the point at which Lieutenant Reichers had warned them that stoppage of the feed-line by the self-sealing lining might occur.

Two cars drove towards the airdrome, attempting to signal the proper runway and direction. A combination of slight dust haze and a low moon, made visibility poor, which was not helped by the fact that the Liberator's left landing light was out. Four drag approaches were made over the field in an attempt to get the orientation of the runway straight. By this time, gasoline was down to fifty gallons according to the gage. By good fortune, the feed-line did not choke in this case, but the pilot and co-pilot were not unnaturally worried.

On their last approach, they got their bearings and saw that the cars and people who had come out had aligned themselves on the right hand side of the runway. They made a wide circle; while they did this, three or four hurrican lanterns, used for house lighting, were set out. The fliers thought that these lanterns were also on the right side of the runway since the cars had been parked on the right.

This assumption turned out to be incorrect because, evidently, someone had joined the ground party that knew something about aviation and had caused them to put the lanterns on the left side of the runway. Since the left hand landing light was out, Lieutenant Reynolds elected to remain in the right seat. Although Lieutenant Matthews was in the pilot's position, Lieutenant Reynolds retained command of the airplane and the decision to land was made by him. They were unable to determine the exact position of the lights until crossing the threshold of the runway, and were within approximately 30 to 50 feet of the ground before being able to determine that the runway was, actually, to the right of the lights.

Lieutenant Reynolds could see the runway and also see the shoulder for some distance to the left of the runway. The shoulder appeared to be equally as good as the runway and he instructed Lieutenant Matthews to land. In fact, the shoulder was equally as good as the runway, or for that matter, the entire area was one large runway with the exception that, on the landing surface, the brush had been cleared away.

Unfortunately, what Lieutenant Matthews could not see until it was too late, was that a construction ditch of some sort had been dug to the left of the left shoulder and a four foot mound of dirt had been thrown up as a result of the ditch being dug. The left wheel dropped into the ditch and numbers 1 and 2 props hit into the mound of dirt. The plane turned to the left into the bank and broke off the left wheel, resulting in a ground loop to the left breaking off both the nose wheel and right wheel.

The crew was uninjured, and arranged shortly thereafter to continue to Cairo.

It seems tragic that the end of so much effort should be a crash at an obscure way station, particularly after the resourcefulness and responsibility of the officer in charge. This was a pioneer trip in may senses, along a route which seems chiefly notable for its lack of facilities.

The remaining three Liberators equipped with the tanks flown to San Diego were safely delivered by December 10th, and were followed by one more. The remainder were turned back at Miami or intermediate domestic stations when the attach upon Pearl Harbor occurred, to take part in the yet more urgent movement of planes to the Indies and to meet their end, fighting, in that desperate campaign.

The movement as carried out boils down to something relatively small and disappointingly slow. Yet its importance remains. In view of the total novelty of the undertaking and the obstacles presented by factors beyond the Command's control, what was achieved, and the fact that a steady flow of planes had been established, even though it was then cut off for high strategic reasons, makes the operation not only a valuable experience, but truly creditable.

C. The 16 Liberator Project

Until October 19hl, plans for formying aircraft to the British over the South Atlantic route with in further than the employment of a civiliza contrest organization to perform the work. In that month a dignificant charge in reliev tack place when Ceneral Armeld directed the Ferrying Consend to make preparations for the foreying of 16 Liberator backers (12-30's) to the British at Cairo, using military Group of the Army Air Coupe. Until that time formying Command deliverise had been to "the point of ultimate take-off" within the Tostorn Radio ephers as directed by the Freedent. He deliveries by military cross had been made outside of Earth America. Not only would those be the Siret deliveries bayogd the continent, but also the first contak mircreft in combat condition to be ferried to an active theater, and the first comban circraft to be east over the South Atlantic to Africa. In retrospect it come a small undertaking, as indeed it was; it appears even loss important than one considers that only five of the sirereft actually departed the United States tefore the Pearl Harbor attack Icrosed the diversion of the remainder electhers. Ent it was in fact an imperbant "first." a piopsor undertaking marked throughout by olerants that word to be characteristic of later ferming energical over the reute.

^{21.} Hemp ACTO for Arnold, Cot 20, 1741, "Availability of Forestmel for Foreying 16 LD-30 Airplanes to Africa," in "Liberatore (16)," Chadrio Vile, ATC Control Files; ACTO "Daily Diory," Cot 18, 20, 1941, in ATC Historical File.

The beckground of Concret Arnold's directive is one of high military and political considerations. At the end of September 1911, the British in the Middle Each were helding the Cormes-Thelian Corves. elong the Egyptian frontier after a covere defeat. The proification of Ereq had recently been completed, the re-eccupation of Erric had been carried out end was toing consolidated, and the British and Duncland were in the process of catablishing themselves in Iran. Morping up operations in Rtalien-dominated East Africa were not get Simished. These varied eperations had required a dengarous dispersel of forces, especially of aircraft, leaving the Espire forces in Symptoconfined to an active defense. In Gieria the great Corman offcmalre continued and though chossed or closed up here and there, in had not get been etopical as it was to be a few conths later before the gates of Homeon, At this critical point in the batale for Enemies the Allies mero searching for every phosphie some, even of the cost sedest earty for amounting diversionary ettechs to relieve the process on the hard reviews and they.

In this etweephore Major Ceneral Coorgo M. Breat, then completing an inspection of the Middle Hest, resided the consluctes that long-stage Liberator beshore, which their wide radius of estion, would provide the best and quickest means of attaching the Cormans in couthern Europe, of strengthening the political position of the Allies locally, and of taking definite offensive action against the forces of Ceneral Reseat. Defens departing Cairo for London to informed General Armold of his intention of recommending to British authorities that 20 of the

the Middle East. On his arrival in Lordon Comercal Erect found both the Frice Minister and Air Chief Marchel Cir Charles Fortal antirely Compatibitio and even antibalisatio. The Latter asked for the delivery of 16 simplemen, the initial equipment of one equatron, and requested that the foreying areas remain to give instruction in their was. The planes were to arrive fully aread and ready for action, equipped with the Sparry beshelphie. In initial atoms of opens parts and supplies was to be sent out by may of the Fon American transport corvice, and the remainder was to be shipped by unter to Cairo. This proposal Constal Erect conveyed on Cotober 17 to Constal Arreld, she gave his bearty approval. To indicated, however, that it would be impossible to loave 16 areas in Egypts & for one centh, was the best that could be done.

The back of making the proliminary examplements, providing the orders, and foreging the booters to Cairo devolved, upon the Persons Command. A disloter Mark of the proparatory steps taken in support of the new mission is impressive. It was necessary, for example, to find excitable cross, to find the planes either at the factory or example to Britain that equid to released, to check them for a fright for which their capacity was not fully known and equip them excended incluy, to propare and assemble the full liet of equipment required for alrevelt and erons in this entirely now type of expretion, to clear the example to passe the example of expretion, to

^{22.} Mag 105, Follers to HILID (Erett for Arnold), Ssp 29, 1941; mag 752, Erett to 765 (for Arnold), Oct 17, 1941; mag Arnold to Erett, Oct 19 6 2 7, 1941, in "Liberators (16)," Comists File, ATO Central Files.

Eritish to the United States and back, to make proper diplomatic correspondents with control contries on route, to incure that creas would be returned promptly by eit, to make certain that runways of landing fields on route would be able to accommedate heavy bombers and that field and old would be called at all points, and, finally, to eccure as mendment to the Promident's directive of Cotober 3, 1964, under which the Command was then operating, to permit foreying by military crows to Africa.

on October 18 the Ferrying Commend's shuttle corvice over the Earth Adlantis to Great Eritain was suspended, temperarily it was believed at the time, pending winterization of the aircraft and the improvement of weather and communications facilities. This released 8 Deck cross, and made it possible to fall the required complement of 16 erose without interfering with the continental deliveries of Liberators from the San Diego Scatory to Commend. Arrangements were made with the Combat Commend to provide four beshardiors, experts in the operation of the Sparry benhalpht and qualified instructors, for the first four cross. In order to assure the prompt return to the United States of the farrying cross, other than these which were to be retained as instructors, the Commend was prepared to establish a fourth Atlantia chattle correles to Cairo, using the B-24to exciting winterization for the resumption of North Atlantic operations. This transport corriges

ves established the following month chartly before the takeoff of the first of the 15 Liberstore.

In the matter of equipping the planes properly for the leas journey, a number of factors were involved. Accurate information had to be becaused on the committee of the airdrenes clong the most coart of Africa before the question could be settled as to whether it was masses many to equip the aircraft with cutra gas tenks, a time-consuming process. If the Journey airdrenes as Batharet, Cambia, (1,652 miles from Match), or the Matchico airdrene at Frentenes, Sierra Leone (1,621 miles) could be used, entre tenks might not be necessary. Even this was not certain, for unofficial information (denied, however, by the Matchiel Division of the Air Corpe) indicated that the self-coaling liming of the Liberator tenks tended to colleges and block the food-line when the game-line in the tanks foll below 200 to 250 gallone. If the landing fields at Pathuret and Frestorn were not machin, and it was necessary to make the flight to Accre, a distance of 2,441 miles from Match, there was no question but that the time had to be taken to find and install the

Egg Memo ACFC for C/AAF, Oct 23, 19A1, "Suspension of Air Corpa Forrying Command Operations over the Morth Atlantic," in 178,22, AAF Classified Files; mand ACFS for Arabid, Cot 20, 19A1, "Aveilability of Fersonnol for Ferrying 16 18-30 Airplanes to Africa;" may 925, Prott to TAG (for Arabid), Cot 30, 19A1;" Rep 40FS to Chief Intel Div, Hov 3, 19A1, "Cablegram," in literature (16)," Common Files, ATG Control Files. For establishment of Fouth Atlantic chartle service, see post, p 110-111, 113-114.

African airfields. To lead at Acura (the point finally extected),
750 gallens extra correctly was rected for each displace, but here was
an engineering problem that had to be colved from stratch, for temb
buy tanks for Liberature did not exist. After considerable experimentation, it was decided that the installation of temb buy tanks for
Eartin 8-25's in sots of three was presticable, and offered the only
means of supplying the extra copacity by using tanks already in
faction. Three could be occured by removing than from 8-25's in the
bomber pool at the Hartin plant in Baltimers. Through the Esterial
Dividen, the Ferrying Command arranged to obtain his of three, a
comple tank and coven additional being chipped by our to the Councils—
dated featury at Can Diego and the remainder by ground freight. The
first tank featallation was completed aband of time on Esterior 12 and
the place left the featory for Folking Field the following day.

Mills the entra tanks were being incielled, the Communican busy

C6. Did ACTO to Chief Heteriol Niv. Cot. 27, 1941. Then bey final tenks for 15-70 especials. The ACTO to Chief Inhol Div. Nov 1, 1941. Total especials to Chief Inhol Div. Nov 1, 1941. Total especials to Chief Div. 6. 1941. Especials especials to Chief House Heteriol Especials to Chief Div. 6. 1941. The Echecule on Chiefs of chiefs and Communication of Chiefs and Chiefs and Communication of Chiefs and Chiefs a

cifical and it impossible to accommission one than two planes of all intel and it impossible to accommission one flights.

Command was obtained on Cotober 27. In a letter to the Secretary of Market on that date the Freedent sutterized the delivery of Market to any point within the African continent. On Beverbay 25, few days efter the first of the Liberators departed the United States, the Freedent issued a "blank cheek" directive authorising extension of Coliveries "to such other places and in much manner as may be mossed only to commy out the Lend-Lease program," on colorgement of cushculty which could be made greater by mething chert of war.

Afterest to the Mid Beets Beg Tyl, Astoli to Ma, Lenden (See Brute), Nov 7, 1941; mag Colini-1570, McReyrolde to Cida (from Baichera), Nov 10, 1941, in "Mileratora (16)," Condrto Wile, Asto Control Viles; mero AUFS for C/AMP, Cot 83, 1941, "Suspension of Air Garge Ferrying Command Operations over the Beath Asimaloge Mai ACFU to G/AM, Cot 24, 1941 at mag, "Suspension of ACFU Operations over the Mark Mark Cotto C/AMP, Est 7, 1941, in 373.23, AMP Chaosified Files; Red CCAS Intel to ACFS, Cot 29, 1941, Tomay Flights through Bouth America," in Told Mark Cot 29, 1941, Formy Flights through Bouth America, in Told Mark Cot 29, 1941, Formy Flights through Bouth America, in Told Mark Cot 29, 1941, Formy Flights through Bouth America, in Told Mark Cot 29, 1941, Formy Flights through Bouth America, in Told Mark Atl. and S. Atl. Formy Restate, Command Files, ATC Control Files.

^{29.} Its Provident to Secy Wes, Oct 29, 1941; its Provident to Seny War, Nov 24, 1941, in 521, ATO Control Files. See 1964, p 144-147.

the the plane landed on a shoulder of the runway instead of the main part and struck a four-foot count of earth alongside a drainage ditch. The tail and completely jorked from the plane and the loft wheal them broke off. The result was a ground loop to the left which broke off the need the right wheal. Although the error was uninjured, it was tregic nevertheless that the end result of co such effort should have been the wrest of a valuable and enough needed displace in the liberator was later salvaged by the Pritich; mountails the crew was flown on to Codro in coether plane to excist in cetting up a training program for the Pritich.

Thited States by December 7, and all four ware delivered entely in Cairo. Pollowing the Fearl Herber attent, the remainder were turned back at Elemi or intermediate demonstra stations to became a part of a got more engant governors of beauty benders to the few Each for the relief of the Entliquines. Here they not their end in the Congruence effort during the confront of the war to held the Jenuaries in the Entliquines.

^{31.} Thidy Ito Maj D. H. Gairns to CO Air See DS Hil No African Hierico; Des Eb. 1911. "Transition Training Program on 18-20 Airplens of 100 Equation, LAS, Vayid, Egypt," in 373.5, Could Atlantic Foreying Trips (1-5, Open Vilo, ATS Control Files.

^{52.} Cairno, "South Atlantic Trip (DA-3, Filet's Esparts" Capt David D. Lancasier, dr. "South Atlantic Trip (Al-DA-), Filet's Esparts" Ed 15 Thadisus G. Syah, Harigator, "Eauth Atlantic Ferrying Trip (Al-DA-5, Filet's Lopert," En 573.5, Eauth Atlantic Trip (Al-DA-5, Filet's Lopert," En 573.5, Eauth Atlantic Ferrying Trips (1-5, Cps Filet, AT) Central Files.

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